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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After being charged with a single count of lewd conduct, Russell Parker 
exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. At trial, the State did not call the alleged 
victim as a witness; instead it relied primarily upon certain inculpatory statements 
Mr. Parker made during one of his interrogations. Mr. Parker contends that the State 
also relied heavily on the alleged victim's out-of-court statements-some of which he 
contends were improperly admitted, and some of which he contends were improperly 
utilized by the prosecution. 
On appeal, Mr. Parker contends first that the district court erred in admitting 
certain out-of-court statements attributed to the alleged victim, as reported through the 
recording of one of Mr. Parker's interrogations. Next, he contends that the State 
engaged in multiple instances of misconduct-two of which related to the out-of-court 
statements attributed to the alleged victim (offering evidence and arguments concerning 
certain of those statements even though that evidence had been ruled inadmissible by 
the district court, and arguing about the truth of the matters asserted in certain other 
statements attributed to the alleged victim, even though those statements were offered 
for a limited (different) purpose), and three of which were unrelated to the alleged 
victim's out-of-court statements (commenting on Mr. Parker's invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, offering "expert" opinion testimony concerning Mr. Parker's 
truthfulness, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury). Finally, 
Mr. Parker argues that, to the extent that any of the errors complained of in this appeal 
1 
are deemed to be harmless, because the accumulation of errors deprived him of a fair 
trial, he is nevertheless entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative error doctrine. 
The State claims that absolutely no errors were committed in this case. (See 
generally Respondent's Brief.) Alternatively, the State argues that if any errors were 
committed, they did not rise to the level of fundamental error and/or were harmless. 
(See generally Respondent's Brief.) 
The present Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments with 
respect to each of Mr. Parker's claims, and to explain why those arguments from the 
State are without merit. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in 
Mr. Parker's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in admitting T.S.'s out-of-court statements through the 
video recording of Mr. Parker's second interrogation? 
2. Did the State engage in one or more instances of misconduct, such that 
Mr. Parker is entitled to a new trial? 
3. Was there such an accumulation of errors in this case that Mr. Parker was 




The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Offer T.S.'s Out-Of-Court Statements 
Through The Video Recording Of Mr. Parker's Second Interrogation 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parker argued that the district court erred in allowing 
the State to offer evidence of T.S.'s out-of-court statements (through the recording of 
Mr. Parker's second interrogation) because it failed to balance undue prejudice against 
probative value, as is required by Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp.8-13.) As noted therein, the district court reasoned that since those statements were 
not being offered for their truth and, therefore, were non-hearsay within the meaning of 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (c), they were "not evidence" and, therefore, the balancing 
test of Rule 403 "does not apply." (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-13 (quoting Tr., p.173, 
Ls.19-21).) 
In response, the State adopts the district court's reasoning, arguing that because 
the statements attributed to T.S. in the recording were not offered for their truth, but 
rather to provide "context" for Mr. Parker's statements during the interrogation, and 
because the district court instructed the jury that the statements attributed to T.S. "are 
not evidence in this case," "it would have been nonsensical for the court to conduct a 
Rule 403 balancing test." (Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.) Alternatively, the State 
argues that, to the extent that the district court erred in failing to conduct the balancing 
required by Rule 403, that error was harmless because: (a) if this Court conducts the 
discretionary balancing test that the district court failed to conduct, the State thinks it will 
conclude that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect (see Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13); and (b) the State thinks that the 
4 
evidence against Mr. Parker is "overwhelming," such that any error in admitting T.S.'s 
statements could not have affected the jury's verdict (see Respondent's Brief, pp.13-
14.) These arguments are without merit. 
First, even though the district court provided the jurors with a very sloppy jury 
instruction incorrectly indicating that the statements attributed to T.S. in the recording 
were "not evidence" (see Tr., p.322, L.7 - p.323, L.21; R., p.99), that instruction did not 
make it so. The district court specifically ruled that the jurors could hear those 
statements, and that the jurors could consider those statements for a specific purpose-
to put Mr. Parker's responses in context. (See Tr., p.172, L.23 - p.175, L.5.) 
Accordingly, the statements were "evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 555-56 (6th ed. 
1990) ("Evidence. Any species of proof, or probative matter, legally presented at the 
trial of an issue, by the act of the parties ad through the medium of witnesses, records, 
documents, exhibits, concrete objects, etc., for the purpose of inducing belief in the 
minds of the court or jury as to their contention."); see a/so ICJI 202 (defining evidence 
as including "exhibits which have been admitted into evidence"; excluding from the 
definition of evidence "testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which [the jury 
has] been instructed to disregard," but not testimony or exhibits which the jury has been 
instructed to consider for a limited purpose); ICJI 308 ("Certain evidence was admitted 
for a limited purpose. At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished that 
it could not be considered by you for any purpose other than the limited purpose for 
which it was admitted. Do not consider such evidence for any purpose except the 
limited purpose for which it was admitted."). 
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Since the statements attributed to T.S., although admitted for a limited purpose, 
were most certainly "evidence," their admissibility was clearly subject to the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence, including Rule 403. Thus, it would not "have been nonsensical for the 
court to conduct a Rule 403 balancing test for admissibility," as the State claims 
(Respondent's Brief, p.11); in fact, it would have been very sensible, as it was the only 
legally correct course of action for the district court. Further, common sense dictates 
that where evidence is admitted for a limited purpose (such as merely to show the 
context of other evidence), it is particularly important to engage in the balancing test 
required by Rule 403. In such cases, the probative value of the evidence is curtailed by 
the limited purpose for which it is offered, and the danger of unfair prejudice is 
heightened by the risk that the jury will consider the evidence for an improper purpose, 
which means that it is more likely that the prejudicial effect of such evidence will 
substantially outweigh its probative value. For example, in this case, the probative 
value of T.S.'s statements was negligible, as the specific wording of the questions or 
comments which prompted Mr. Parker to make the statements that he did was relatively 
unimportant; what was, by far, most important to the State's case was the content of 
Mr. Parker's eventual inculpatory statements. Further, the danger of unfair prejudice 
was substantial since, even with a limiting instruction, all it would take to change the 
outcome of Mr. Parker's case would be for one or more jurors to be subconsciously 
influenced by a police officer's claim that the non-testifying alleged victim had 
substantiated the State's case. 1 
1 While the State points out that, under Idaho law, "it is presumed that the jury follows a 
limiting instruction" (Respondent's Brief, p.10 (quoting State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 
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Second, insofar as the State argues (in the alternative) that any error on the part 
of the district court in failing to conduct the required analysis under Rule 403 was 
harmless because this Court may conduct the required analysis itself, its argument rests 
on the faulty assumption that this Court can conduct the Rule 403 balancing test de 
novo. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13.) Specifically, the State relies on State v. 
Floyd, 125 Idaho 651 (Ct. App. 1994), for the proposition that, if the district court abuses 
its discretion in failing to conduct the required balancing test under Rule 403, "it is 
appropriate for an appellate court to independently consider the admissibility of 
175 (Ct. App. 1995», the State fails to mention that this presumption only goes so far. 
As was recently noted by the Court of Appeals: 
[A]lthough we normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to 
disregard inadmissible evidence, this presumption cannot shield all errors 
from appellate review, regardless of the severity of the error or the 
forcefulness and effectiveness of the instruction. As the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized: 
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will 
not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the 
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the 
practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be 
ignored. 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 ... (1968). We have similarly 
noted that where the evidence presents a close question for the jury, "a 
corrective instruction, even one that is forceful, might be insufficient to 
cure the prejudicial effect" of very damaging evidence. State v. Keyes, 150 
Idaho 543, 545 0 •• (Ct. App. 2011). 
State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764,768 (Ct. App. 2012); see, e.g., State v. Pokorney, 149 
Idaho 459, 466 (2010) ("Even with a limiting instruction, there was a high risk that the 
jury would convict Pokorney based upon propensity and sexual deviancy. We are 
constrained to conclude that the unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative 
value of the evidence."); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669-70 (2010) (holding that 
error in admitting "prior bad act" evidence was prejudicial even though a limiting 
instruction had been given); State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229 n.3 (2008) (noting in 
dicta that the pattern jury instruction, when it failed to specifically identify the "prior bad 
act" in question, was "probably not sufficient to ameliorate the likelihood of unfair 
prejudice" attendant to admission of that evidence). 
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evidence under I.R.E. 403 .... " (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) However, the State's 
reading of Floyd is incorrect. 
Floyd was not as sweeping as the State suggests though. While it is true that in 
Floyd the Court of Appeals found error in the district court's failure to conduct the proper 
inquiry under Rule 403, then concluded that the error was harmless, it appears that the 
Court of Appeals engaged in the Rule 403 analysis in that case only at the urging of the 
defendant-appellant. See Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654 ("Upon the urging of Floyd's counsel 
at oral argument, this Court listened to and reviewed Floyd's statement independently of 
the district court's action.") Thus, it appears that Floyd was an aberration, occasioned 
by the unique circumstances of that particular case, and does not stand for the general 
proposition that "it is appropriate for an appellate court to independently consider the 
admissibility of evidence under I.R.E. 403," where the district court has failed to do SO.2 
In fact, if Floyd did stand for such a proposition, it would be in conflict with Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent on this point. See State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 241 
2 Even if the Floyd approach is not limited to circumstances in which the defendant-
appellant specifically asks the appellate court to evaluate the evidence itself, it still is not 
as sweeping as the State suggests. In Floyd, the Court of Appeals did not engage in a 
de novo weighing of probative value against unfair prejudice and exercise its own 
discretion; it simply held that the evidence was "so clearly probative and lacking in unfair 
prejudice, that ... it would have been an abuse of discretion by the district court to 
exclude" that evidence. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654. The outcome of the weighing of 
probative value against unfair prejudice is not so obvious in this case. As discussed 
above, the probative value of the statements attributed to T.S. was negligible, given that 
those statements were offered only to lend context to Mr. Parker's inculpatory 
statements. And, given the nature of the evidence at issue-out-of-court statements 
attributed to a non-testifying child, who was also the alleged victim, the danger of unfair 
prejudice to Mr. Parker was extraordinary. Thus, on remand, the district court could 
very easily find-without abusing its discretion-that the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence and, therefore, exclude the 
evidence under Rule 403. 
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(2009) ('The district court erred by applying the wrong standard for admissibility of 
alternate perpetrator evidence, and therefore, abused its discretion. Therefore, this 
Court grants Meister a new triaL"); see also State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471 (2010) 
(finding error in the district court's failure to conduct a Rule 403 analysis, and making no 
effort to conduct that analysis in its stead).3 
Third, insofar as the State argues (again, in the alternative) that any error on the 
part of the district court in failing to conduct the required analysis under Rule 403 was 
harmless because the evidence against Mr. Parker is "overwhelming," such that any 
error admitting T.S.'s statements could not have affected the jury's verdict (see 
Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14), its argument again rests on a faulty assumption. 
Contrary to the State's suggestion, the relevant inquiry is not whether this Court 
believes that Mr. Parker is surely guilty; it is whether the State has proven, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Chapman v. 
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221-22 (2010). "To 
say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is ... to find that error unimportant in 
relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in 
the record." Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991). The issue is whether the jury 
actually rested its verdict on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the 
inadmissible evidence. Id. at 404-05. "The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a 
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, 
3 Even though Meister and Ruiz were both cited in Mr. Parker's Appellant's Brief (pp.12-
13), the State has failed to acknowledge them. (See generally Respondent's Brief.) 
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but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to 
the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993). 
In this case, it cannot be said that the abuse of discretion in admitting the out-of-
court statements attributed to TS. through the interrogation video surely did not 
contribute to the guilty verdict. As noted in Mr. Parker's Appellant's Brief, the State's 
case rested primarily on Mr. Parker's own inculpatory statements; however, Mr. Parker 
testified at trial that the inculpatory statements he made during the interrogation were 
false-the product of a long interrogation, bullying by the police, and impaired thinking 
because of prescription painkillers. (See Appellant's Brief, p.3 & n.3.) Accordingly, the 
entire case for the State came down to which of Mr. Parker's versions of events the jury 
was to believe. Under these circumstances, anything that the State could do to tip the 
scales in favor of having the jury believe the inculpatory statements Mr. Parker made 
during his second interrogation also tipped the scales in favor of a conviction. Thus, the 
State made a prodigious effort to bootstrap the alleged out-of-court statements of its 
non-testifying child witness (or at least their general content) into the jury box-whether 
through the repetition of those alleged statements by a police officer during Mr. Parker's 
interrogation, the testimony of other witnesses to whom TS. allegedly made 
disclosures, or testimony conveying the substance of TS.'s nightmare-related "sleep 
talk"-because all such evidence conveyed to the jury certain very powerful information: 
that child, who never actually testified at trial, had substantiated the charges against 
Mr. Parker. As such, any and all evidence tending to raise the inference that TS. had 
implicated Mr. Parker was likely to have had a substantial impact on the jury's 
deliberations and, ultimately, its verdict. 
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II. 
The State Engaged In Misconduct Necessitating A New Trial 
In his Appel/ant's Brief, Mr. Parker asserted that the State committed five distinct 
types of misconduct: (a) offering evidence and argument which had been ruled 
inadmissible; (b) arguing hearsay evidence, admitted for a limited purpose, for its truth; 
(c) commenting on Mr. Parker's silence; (d) offering opinion testimony concerning 
Mr. Parker's purported untruthfulness; and (e) appealing to the passions and prejudices 
of the jurors. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.13-44.) He also argued that these instances of 
misconduct rose to the level of fundamental error, such that they can be reviewed on 
appeal even in the absence of contemporaneous objections by defense counsel. (See 
Appel/ant's Brief, pp.13-44.) 
In response, the State addresses each claim of misconduct in turn, arguing with 
regard to each that no misconduct occurred and, even if it did, the misconduct did not 
rise to the level of fundamental error. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.14-48.) 
For reasons that are set forth fully below, Mr. Parker asserts that the State's 
arguments are without merit and that, in fact, misconduct amounting to fundamental 
error did occur in Mr. Parker's trial. 
A. It Was Misconduct To Convey T.S.'s "Sleep Talk" To The JUry 
In his Appel/ant's Brief, Mr. Parker pointed out that the district court initially made 
it clear that it wanted an opportunity to complete its research and issue a ruling on the 
"sleep talk" issue before the State introduced any "sleep talk" evidence, and that the 
district court ultimately ruled that the "sleep talk" could not be admitted for any purpose. 
(Appel/ant's Brief, pp.14-15.) Thus, he argued that the prosecutor engaged in 
11 
misconduct, which rose to the level of fundamental error, by offering arguments and 
evidence concerning T.S.'s "sleep talk," and thereby conveying the substance of that 
"sleep talk" to the jury. (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-22.) 
In response, the State begins by arguing that the prosecutor did nothing wrong, 
in that he did not violate any order of the court. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.17 -20 & 
n.2.) The crux of this argument is the State's contention that, because the district court 
only ruled that the "statements" T.S. made in his sleep were inadmissible, it only 
prohibited the State from eliciting from its witness direct quotes of T.S.'s alleged "sleep 
talk." (See Respondent's Brief, p. 18.)4 Thus, the State contends that it was free to offer 
evidence concerning the fact that those statements were made, and the effect of those 
statements on the listener (and on people who heard about those statements from the 
listener). (See Respondent's Brief, p.18l Further, the State argues at various points 
that it was perfectly free to offer all of this evidence about the "sleep talk" for the 
purpose of having the jury infer "that T.S.'s sleep-talk statements were related to 
4 Specifically, the State argues as follows: "The ongoing issue concerning T.S.'s sleep-
talk was clearly about whether the words T.S. uttered could be admitted .. " [T]he 
prosecutor did not violate any order by the district court. The state never disclosed to 
the jury the actual statements made by T.S. during his sleep-talk." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.8 (underlining added).) Elsewhere, the State makes similar arguments: "Parker can 
point to no actual 'statements' made by T.S. during his nightmare or 'sleep-talk' that 
were admitted at trial . . .. [T]here were no 'statements' made by T.S. that were 
presented at trial . . .. The statements made by T.S. during his nightmare ... were 
never disclosed to the jury." (Respondent's Brief, p.22 (underlining added; italics in 
original).) 
5 Specifically, the State argues as follows: "The court did not rule that the state could not 
present testimony of the fact that T.S. had a nightmare and engaged in sleep-talk that 
caused Joy Heinbach to report what she heard to T.S.'s mother and the police." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.18.) Elsewhere, the State makes similar arguments: "The state 
was entitled to present testimony that T.S. had a nightmare during which he made non-
specified statements which caused Joy Heinbach to report what she had heard to T.S.'s 
mother and the police." (Respondent's Brief, pp.22.) 
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Parker's sexual misconduct" (Respondent's Brief, p.22), and to then argue to the jury 
that it should find that T.S.'s nightmare was caused by that sexual misconduct: 
[I]t was entirely appropriate for the prosecutor to use evidence presented 
at trial (T.S.'s nightmare) and reasonable inferences from that evidence 
(that T.S.'s nightmare was related to Parker's sexual misconduct), as a 
theme for the state's case .... 
. . . Because the fact of T.S.'s nightmare was presented to the jury 
as evidence during trial, the prosecutor was entitled to discuss that 
evidence and the reasonable inferences to be derived from it. As noted, 
the jury would have been able to reasonably infer, based on the concerns 
and responses by Joy Heinbach and T.S.'s mother, that T.S.'s nightmare 
was related to sexual misconduct by Parker. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.46.) 
The State has adopted an unsupportable position. Not only does it seek to have 
this Court interpret the district court's ruling in an unreasonably narrow way, but it also 
argues that if a court excludes a given piece of evidence, a party is nevertheless free to 
seek to have the jury infer the existence of that evidence. The State's arguments are 
unreasonable on both fronts. 
With regard to the State's interpretation of the district court's ruling, it is 
inconceivable that the district court intended to exclude direct quotes of the "sleep talk" 
attributed to T.S., but not the general content of the "sleep talk." It is important to 
remember that the district court's ruling came about in light of the Idaho Supreme 
Court's opinion in State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971 (1992), which had held that 
"sleep talk" is utterly irrelevant and unreliable. If such evidence is utterly irrelevant and 
unreliable, it is not just the precise quote of the alleged "sleep talk" that is problematic; 
none of its content should be conveyed to the jury. Indeed, in this case, the district 
court correctly issued an unequivocal ruling concerning the "sleep talk": 
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Well, I'm going to find that the statements that were made while the 
defendant-or while the alleged victim was asleep and dreaming are not 
admissible. They are not admissible because their prejudicial effect 
outweighs their probative value in terms of evidence presented to the jUry. 
Where our Supreme Court-or our appellate courts have held 
clearly that things that are said while someone is sleeping or having a 
nightmare are not admissible evidence, I think it would be inappropriate to 
allow that testimony to go to the jury for any purpose, and I'm going to rule 
that is not admissible. 
We have the testimony in this case of the child's change in 
behavior, of the sexual acting out. Those are sufficient factors, as I've 
already said, to establish corroboration of the defendant's statements, and 
I just don't want to introduce the utilization of evidence to the jury which, in 
my opinion, would place reversible error in this case. 
The parties simply-it's not admissible evidence, and to allow it to 
go to the jury, I believe, is more prejudicial than probative. And that's what 
I'm going to rule. 
(Tr., p.283, L.16 - p.284, L.17 (emphasis added).) Taking the district court's ruling as a 
whole, it is abundantly clear that the problem the district court found with the "sleep talk" 
evidence in this case is that it is tremendously prejudicial (and, apparently, only 
minimally probative, if relevant at all). Thus, it would have made no sense at all to 
exclude direct quotes of that "sleep talk," while allowing the substance of that "sleep 
talk" to go to the jury. Clearly, the district court's ruling was aimed at preventing the jury 
from learning of the content of the "sleep talk," not merely the precise words attributed 
to T.S. 
Because it was the substance of the "sleep talk" that was inadmissible, it should 
not have been presented to the jury at all. Idaho law is well-settled that is misconduct 
for a prosecutor to "back-door" evidence that is known to be inadmissible. See, e.g., 
State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 302 (Ct. App. 2013) ("Idaho courts have 
recognized that prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the answer is inadmissible 
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and excluded, but the jury can infer what the answer would have been simply from the 
content of the question."); State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 683-84 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(finding misconduct where the prosecutor phrased a question in such a manner as to 
allow the jury to infer certain information which the district court had already ruled 
inadmissible); State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007) ("Prosecutorial 
misconduct includes asking questions where the answer is inadmissible, but the jury 
can infer what the answer would have been simply from the questioned asked."); 
State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2001) (finding misconduct where the 
district court had ruled a certain medical report inadmissible (because it was hearsay) 
and the prosecutor repeatedly attempted to elicit testimony from a police officer as to 
the contents of that report); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587, 594-97 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(finding misconduct where certain testimony was deemed to be inadmissible hearsay 
and the prosecutor attempted to elicit it anyway); ct., e.g., State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 
53, 63, 67 (2011) (expressing concern at one point that the prosecutor "seem[ed] to 
have completely ignored the court's admonition to 'move on,' by immediately asking 
another inflammatory question," and, at another point, finding that where a testifying 
police officer "gratuitously and unnecessarily injected his clearly inadmissible opinion" 
into the case, the State's conduct would have been held to be improper if it had been 
challenged as such).6 
6 Although most of these cases were cited in Mr. Parker's Appellant's Brief (pp.19-20), 
the State makes no attempt to explain how they comport with its contention that, when 
evidence is excluded as unduly prejudicial, the prosecutor may simply ask the jury to 
infer the existence of such evidence. 
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The State's second argument with regard to the "sleep talk" issue is that 
Mr. Parker cannot demonstrate fundamental error and, therefore, this Court cannot 
grant Mr. Parker relief for the prosecutor's unobjected-to misconduct. (See 
Respondent's Brief, pp.20-25.) Specifically, the State contends that Mr. Parker cannot 
show a violation of an unwaived constitutional right because there was no Confrontation 
Clause violation in this case; there is no error that is clear in this case because (a) there 
was no Confrontation Clause violation, and (b) defense counsel may have chosen not to 
object to the "sleep talk" evidence because it was actually admissible; and Mr. Parker 
cannot show any effect on the outcome of the proceedings because, "practically 
speaking," it is indisputable that Mr. Parker committed the lewd acts at issue. (See 
Respondent's Brief, pp.20-25.) The State's arguments in this regard are meritless. 
First, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Parker has identified the constitutional 
right at issue with regard to the prosecutor's "sleep talk"-related misconduct as "his right 
to a fair trial and due process of law," as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution (Appellant's Brief, p.20 & n.11), the State argues there was no 
Confrontation Clause violation (Respondent's Brief, pp.20-24). The State's arguments 
might have merit if Mr. Parker had raised a Confrontation Clause claim; however, he did 
not. Accordingly, the State's Confrontation Clause analysis is nothing more than a 
"straw man" argument, which should be disregarded as irrelevant. 
As noted, the argument actually presented was that the prosecutor's misconduct 
in asking the jury to draw inferences about evidence which the district court had 
specifically ruled inadmissible for any purpose violated Mr. Parker's rights to due 
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process and a fair trial. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.20-22.) The State's only response to 
this argument is to suggest that, unless a more specific Constitutional guarantee is cited 
(such as the Confrontation Clause), any claim of error alleges nothing more than a 
"slight" violation of the rules of evidence; further, it insists, categorically, that "Appellants 
should not prevail on such speculative claims of deprivation of amorphous rights, but 
must rely on actual infringement of specific rights." (Respondent's Brief, pp.20-21 n.3 
(citing United States v. Marshall, 526 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1975)).) 
There are at least two fatal flaws with the State's position. First, the authority 
relied upon by the State, United States v. Marshall, does not actually support the 
proposition for which it is cited. In Marshall, the Ninth Circuit did observe that the 
defendant-appellant's claim of a constitutional violation (arising out of a denial of a 
request for "extensive discovery" in order to investigate an allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct) was "tenuous" and "speculative". Marshall, 526 F.2d at 1355. However, it 
certainly did not do so because the defendant-appellant failed to cite a more specific 
constitutional provision, as the State suggests7; it did so based on the merits of the 
defendant-appellant's claim. Id. Second, the State's argument is in conflict with 
Supreme Court precedent making it clear that even where prosecutorial misconduct 
does not infringe upon specific rights guaranteed by the Constitution, it may still violate 
the Constitution by rendering the defendant's trial unfair. See Darden v. Wainwright, 
477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1974). 
See also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010) ("Where a prosecutor attempts to 
7 In fact, in Marshall, the defendant-appellant apparently did cite a specific constitutional 
guarantee-the right to counsel. See Marshall, 526 F.2d at 1355 ("Their claim is a 
denial of an alleged right to separate and privately retained counsel."). 
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secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and 
the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair 
triaL). As the Supreme Court has recognized, "The relevant question is whether the 
prosecutors' [actions] 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process.'" Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly, 416 
U.S. at 643). For the reasons set forth in Mr. Parker's Appellant's Brief (pp.20-22), the 
prosecutor's copious arguments and evidence concerning T.S.'s "sleep talk," which had 
the effect of conveying the substance of that "sleep talk" to the jury, was not only 
misconduct, but misconduct rising to the level of a Constitutional violation. 
Second, the State's arguments notwithstanding, the fact is that the prosecutor's 
misconduct, and the constitutional violation arising therefrom, is plain. Although the 
State argues that no Confrontation Clause violation is clear or obvious on the record 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.22-23), as noted above, the Confrontation Clause is not actually 
at issue in this case. The relevant inquiries are whether the prosecutor committed 
misconduct when he asked the jury to draw inferences about evidence which the district 
court had specifically ruled inadmissible, and whether that misconduct so infected the 
trial with unfairness that it resulted in a constitutional violation. For the reasons set forth 
in Mr. Parker's Appellant's Brief, he contends that the misconduct and the resulting 
unfairness of the proceeding is obvious. 
Further, although the State argues that the constitutional error is not plain 
because Mr. Parker's counsel could have chosen not to object based on his belief that 
the prosecutor's actions were proper (Respondent's Brief, p.24), this argument is 
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meritless because it is wholly dependent on the assumption that the district court 
prohibited the State from offering only direct "sleep talk" quotes attributed to T.S., not 
the substance of that "sleep talk." If that were true though, there would have been no 
misconduct in the first instance and, as such, there would be no need for this Court to 
determine whether the error was plain. More importantly though, as discussed above, 
the State's premise is flawed, as the district court precluded the State from offering the 
content of the "sleep talk" in any form. And, because it did so, the prosecutor's efforts to 
bootstrap the content of that "sleep talk" into the jury box was clear misconduct, and 
there could have been no reasonable strategy to defense counsel's failure to object. 
Third, and finally, the State argues that Mr. Parker has not shown any prejudice 
attendant to the prosecutor's efforts to present the jurors with T.S.'s "sleep talk." 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.24-25.) The State reasons that because Mr. "Parker confessed 
to both Detective Heatherly and Detective Smith that he committed two separate acts 
constituting lewd and lascivious conduct," the jury was left, "practically speaking, with 
only the decision of whether [Mr.] Parker had the requisite sexual intent at the time he 
committed the acts," and, since T.S.'s sleep talk was relevant only to whether the acts 
were committed, they did not bear on the intent issue and, therefore, could not have 
impacted the jury's verdict. (Respondent's Brief, pp.24-25 (emphasis in original).) This 
argument, however, is meritless, as it rests on a flawed assumption-that Mr. Parker's 
inculpatory statements during his second interrogation are absolute, incontrovertible 
proof of his guilt. Nothing could be further from the truth though.8 As noted, Mr. Parker 
8 The State apparently subscribes to the belief that innocent people do not confess 
falsely, and that they certainly do not confess falsely to serious crimes just to make the 
interrogation cease. (See Respondent's Brief, p.24 n.5 ("Parker testified that he 
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testified that his confession to police was false-the product of a long interrogation, 
bullying by the police, impaired thinking because of prescription painkillers, and a desire 
to just have the interrogation stop. The jury was certainly free to believe that testimony, 
especially where it was consistent with Mr. Parker's denials of culpability when 
confronted with T.S.'s mother, and during his first interrogation. Indeed, as has been 
noted, the prosecutor's attempts to present the jury with T.S.'s alleged out-of-court 
statements, including his "sleep talk," was an obvious (although improper) attempt to 
corroborate the inculpatory statements Mr. Parker made during the second 
interrogation-the only hard evidence the State could offer as to the commission of any 
confessed to a lewd and lascivious act because he was 'must giving [the detectives] 
what they wanted so [he] could leave.' Whatever Parker may have believed about his 
chances of being released, it seems highly unlikely he would have concluded they 
would improve once he confessed to committing lewd conduct."). The State's view is 
remarkably uninformed. The fact is that we now know that people most certainly do 
confess falsely. In fact, Innocence Project data reveal that 25% of DNA exoneration 
cases to date involved false confessions. See Innocence Project website (available at 
<http://www.innocenceproject.org/>) (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). Further, it is also 
known that individuals confess falsely in a misguided effort to make their interrogations 
end. Dr. Richard Leo, a leading expert on the subject of false confessions, has written 
as follows: 
The custodial environment and physical confinement are intended to 
isolate and disempower the suspect. Interrogation is designed to be 
stressful and unpleasant, and it is more stressful and unpleasant the more 
intense it becomes and the longer it lasts. Interrogation techniques are 
meant to cause the suspect to perceive that his guilt has been established 
beyond any conceivable doubt, that no one will believe his claims of 
innocence, and that by continuing to deny the detectives' accusations he 
will only make his situation (and the ultimate outcome of the case against 
him) much worse. The suspect may perceive that he has no choice but to 
comply with the detectives' wishes, because he is fatigued, worn down, or 
simply sees no other way to escape an intolerably stressful experience. 
Some suspects come to believe that the only way they will be able to 
leave is if they do what the detectives say. 
Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCH. & LAW, Sept. 2009, 332-43 (available at 
<http://www.jaapl.org/contentl37/3/332.full>). 
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crime. And, since the content of the "sleep talk" (in conjunction with the other out-of-
court statements attributed to TS.) was critical in convincing the jury that Mr. Parker 
was truthful during his second interrogation, but not when he testified at trial, it 
undoubtedly had an impact on the jury's verdict. 
8. It Was Misconduct To Argue Hearsay, Admitted For A Limited Purpose (To Show 
The Effect On The Listener) As Substantive Evidence 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parker pointed out that, although TS.'s out-of-court 
statements to certain witnesses were not admitted for their truth (but rather to 
supposedly show their effects on the listeners), the prosecutor, in summation, 
nevertheless asked the jurors to: (a) infer that TS. made damning disclosures 
concerning Mr. Parker, and (b) believe those disclosures for their truth. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.23-28.) Mr. Parker argued that this tactic on the part of the prosecutor was not 
only misconduct, but that it rose to the level of fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.23-28.) 
In response, the State argues that Mr. "Parker'S argument is factually baseless," 
because TS. was never directly quoted and, therefore, "TS.'s statements were not 
admitted for any purpose .... " (Respondent's Brief, pp.26-27.) The State further 
asserts that Mr. Parker has failed to demonstrate fundamental error because the 
statements attributed to TS. were never directly quoted, it was perfectly reasonable and 
permissible for the prosecutor to imply, and for the jurors to infer, the content of those 
statements, and there was no Confrontation Clause violation under the circumstances. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.27-29.) 
The State's arguments are without merit. Initially, the State is incorrect insofar as 
it claims that there was no misconduct because the State's witnesses never testified to 
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specific quotes attributed to T.S. As noted above, it is the general content of those 
statements, not the particular language used, that is the problem. Clearly, where Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 801 (c) defines "hearsay" as an out-of-court statement offered for its 
truth, and Rule 802 general prohibits the admission of hearsay, those Rules are aimed 
at preventing the content of the declarants' out-of-court statements from being disclosed 
in an effort to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein-whether that content is 
conveyed by means of a direct quote, a summary, or clear inference. And here, the 
State's evidence clearly conveyed the content of T.S.'s out-of-court statements. 
Obviously, this does not end the inquiry though. The question is not whether the 
State should have been allowed to offer the content of T.S.'s alleged disclosures (or 
even direct quotes attributed to T.S.), as that evidentiary question was not preserved 
below; the question is whether, after having gained admission of evidence of T.S.'s 
alleged out-of-court statements by promising that those alleged statements would not 
be offered for their truth, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing to the jury in 
summation that those statements should, in fact, be taken as true. 
And, on this question, the first inquiry is whether the prosecutor did, in fact, urge 
the jurors to consider T.S.'s alleged disclosures for their truth. On this point, Mr. Parker 
contends that the prosecutor's words speak for themselves, and that, when considered 
in context, they clearly reveal that the State urged the jurors to believe not only that T.S. 
implicated Mr. Parker, but that he truthfully implicated Mr. Parker. This first set of 
improper comments follow: 
We know that during that same period of, [T.S.], a happy-go-lucky 
kid according to his uncle, according to his mom, according to the 
defendant, all of a sudden takes a downturn. His potty training stops. He 
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is having nightmares. He is acting out sexually against a two-year-old 
cousin. 
Why does this just suddenly happen? 
This isn't just a kid that's growing up. Something is happening to 
this child. 
What do we also know? 
We know that [T.S.] spoke to Austin, spoke to Vanessa, spoke to 
Joy [the babysitter], and he told them things that made them concerned 
enough that Vanessa separated [T.S.) from the defendant, Russell Parker, 
and also serious enough that she called the police. 
What else do we know? 
Well, we just spent the last hour or so watching the defendant's 
own statement from September th of 2010, where he pretty graphically 
admits to what he did .... 
(Tr., p.388, LA - p.389, L.1 (emphasis added).) A few moments later, the prosecutor 
returned to this line of improper argument in explaining why the State met its burden of 
corroborating Mr. Parker's statements under the corpus delicti rule: 
And the State has presented to you way more evidence than would 
be just a sliver of evidence. And these are some of the things that support 
the defendant's own statements. 
We know that the defendant had access to [T.S.], that he was 
baby-sitting him for a two-at least a two-month period. 
We know that [T.S.]'s decline in behavior, that it coincides with the 
same time that the defendant is watching the child. 
We know that [T.S.] simulates an act of oral sex on his two-year-old 
cousin .... 
We know that exactly matches what the defendant admits to doing, 
to Detective Heatherly on September tho 
We also know, as I have already said, that [T.S.1 says things to his 
family, to Joy, that make them remove [T.S.1 from the defendant's 
presence. 
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(Tr., p.391, L.18 - p.392, L.11 (emphasis added).) Finally, the prosecutor made his 
most blatant plea for the jurors to take TS.'s alleged disclosures for their truth: 
How do we know that the defendant committed an oral-to-genital 
act upon TS? 
Well, again, he had access. And we know that [TS.] was acting 
out sexually. 
I don't think I can stress enough that it is not a coincidence that it is 
the exact same act that the defendant admits to performing on [TS.] 
[TS.] tries to commit-to perform oral sex on [his cousin]. Lo and behold, 
the defendant has admitted to doing the same act on [T.S.] That's more 
than a coincidence. 
And again, [TS.] made statements to Vanessa and Austin that 
make them move [T.S.] away from the defendant's care. 
(Tr., p.394, LS.12-15 (emphasis added).) 
Amazingly, the State sees nothing wrong with the foregoing arguments. It seems 
to think that once evidence has been presented, the prosecutor is free to argue any 
reasonable interpretation of that evidence-even if the evidence was not admissible for 
a given purpose. 9 (See Respondent's Brief, pp.27-28.) However, this is simply not the 
law. As was discussed in Mr. Parker's Appellant's Brief (p.26), it is well settled that 
where trial evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, it is improper for a party to argue 
it for a different purpose. Cooke v. State, 149 Idaho 233, 242-43 (Ct. App. 2010); 
9 In particular, the State argues as follows: 
Any reasonable juror would have concluded from the testimony presented 
at trial that TS. had said something about [Mr.] Parker to Vanessa Marsh, 
Austin Marsh, and Joy Heinback that warranted their concern. It is well 
settled that both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable 
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, 
from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom. It was not improper for the prosecutor to imply, or even 
state directly, what the evidence at trial reasonable showed. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.27-28 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).) 
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State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 
507-08 (1999). In light of this authority, Mr. Parker contends that there can be no 
question that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. 
The remaining question then, is whether the prosecutor's misconduct rises to the 
level of fundamental error. The State claims that, because Mr. Parker cannot show any 
misconduct, and because there was no Confrontation Clause violation under the 
circumstances, there can be no fundamental error in this case. The State is mistaken. 
First, as discussed above, the prosecutor clearly engaged in misconduct when asked 
the jurors to believe the truth of T.S.'s alleged out-of-court statements even though they 
were supposedly only offered to show the effects on the listeners. Second, as is 
discussed in Part II (A), supra, the State's Confrontation Clause argument is nothing 
more than a "straw man," as Mr. Parker's prosecutorial misconduct claims allege 
violation of his rights to a fair trial and due process of claw, not his right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses. And, for the same reasons that are discussed in Part II(A) 
(and in Mr. Parker's Appel/ant's Brief), he asserts that the prosecutor's violation of fair 
trial and due process rights is clear. Finally, he contends that the prosecutor's 
misconduct affected the verdict. As has been discussed throughout this appeal, 
because the key evidence against Mr. Parker was his potentially-false confession, the 
State's attempts to convince the jury that T.S. had corroborated that confession was 
critical to having it be believed by the jury and, therefore, undoubtedly impacted the 
verdict. 
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C. It Was Misconduct To Comment On Mr. Parker's Invocation Of His Fifth 
Amendment Rights 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parker argued that it was misconduct for the 
prosecutor to ask Detective Smith about Mr. Parker's invocation of his Fifth Amendment 
right to silence during the second interrogation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-32.) In 
particular, he argued that it was improper for the prosecutor to ask Det. Smith, "How did 
the interview end?" and for Det. Smith to respond by testifying, "As I was talking to him 
about these things, he said, 'I'm done.' And since I had promised him that he could 
leave whenever he wished to leave, I took that as a sign that he did not want to talk to 
us anymore." (Tr., p.238, Ls.19-25.) 
In response, the State argues that the foregoing exchange was not an 
impermissible, i.e., unconstitutional, comment on Mr. Parker'S silence (much less a 
"clear or obvious" act of misconduct, as is required to make out a claim of fundamental 
error) because the prosecutor did not subjectively intend to have the jury infer 
Mr. Parker's guilt based on his exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights; rather, the State 
says, the prosecutor innocently intended to "inform the jury that the lengthy interview 
reached its conclusion." (Respondent's Brief, pp.30, 31-34.) In addition, the State 
contends that, even if there was misconduct and a constitutional violation, Mr. Parker 
cannot show that it affected the outcome of his case because the jury had already heard 
that he had admitted to the actus reus underlying the charged offense. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.34-35.) 
The State's arguments do not withstand scrutiny. With regard to the question of 
whether the prosecutor and Detective Smith impermissibly, i.e., unconstitutionally, 
commented on Mr. Parker's silence, the State's argument rests on the belief that the 
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only relevant consideration is whether the prosecutor subjectively intended to have the 
jury infer the defendant's guilt based on his exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights. 
This is not the standard though. 1o The test, in a slightly different Fifth Amendment 
context, "is whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such 
character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the 
failure of the accused to testify." State v. Wright, 97 Idaho 229, 232 (1975) (quoting 
Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir. 1955)) (emphasis added). See also 
Doyle V. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-20 & n.8 (1976) (prohibiting comment on the 
defendant's post-Miranda silence, even if his silence is not intended to be used as 
evidence of guilt, but rather for impeachment purposes, and recognizing that "every 
post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous"). Thus, Mr. Parker's Fifth Amendment rights 
were violated if the prosecutor and/or detective subjectively intended to comment on his 
silence, or if their comments were of such a character that the jury naturally would have 
construed them as a comment on his silence. 
Here, the exchange between the prosecutor and the detective was of such a 
character that the jury would have necessarily taken it to be a comment on Mr. Parker's 
invocation of his rights. Detective Smith testified that he rehashed with Mr. Parker the 
inculpatory statements Mr. Parker had already made to Detective Heatherly regarding 
oral-to-genital contact with T.S., then moved on to ask Mr. Parker about anal contact 
with T.S. (See Tr., p.238, Ls.1-14.) According to Detective Smith it was at this point in 
10 As even the State acknowledges, the purpose of reviewing prosecutorial misconduct 
is "not to discipline the prosecutor for misconduct, but to ensure that any such 
misconduct did not interfere with the defendant's right to a fair triaL" (Respondent's 
Brief, p.16 (quoting State V. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 451 (Ct. App. 1991)).) 
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the interrogation that Mr. Parker said "I'm done," and terminated the interrogation. (See 
Tr., p.238, Ls.13-21.) The suggestion to the jury was that once Detective Smith had 
moved into a new set of allegations regarding anal contact, for which Mr. Parker had no 
explanation or defense, he abruptly cut off the interrogation. And the obvious inference 
to be drawn by a lay juror under such circumstances is that Mr. Parker must be guilty 
because an innocent person would seek to clear his name. 
However, even if the subjective intent of the prosecutor and/or detective is all that 
matters, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that, where there is no valid reason 
for asking about the defendant's invocation of his rights, the appellate court can 
reasonably infer that the prosecutor and/or the testifying officer intended to comment on 
the defendant's silence. In State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53 (2011), for example, where 
the Idaho Supreme Court found misconduct in the prosecutor's asking of a question 
which led to a police detective gratuitously and unnecessarily stating that he "attempted 
to" interview the defendant, the Court suggested that it could infer the prosecutor's 
intent based on the fact that there was absolutely no good reason for the prosecutor to 
have asked the question that he did. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61. This case is no 
different. Here, although the State was able to identify a 31 year old Louisiana case 
which held that it is reasonable and permissible for a prosecutor to "explor[e] how the 
interrogation was concluded," and it ran a long way with the reasoning of that case 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.32-33 (quoting State v. Kersey, 406 SO.2d 555, 559-60 (La. 
1981))),11 the simple fact is that there is absolutely no relevance to how Mr. Parker's 
11 Mr. Parker contends that Kersey is poorly reasoned and, therefore, is not worth a 
second thought. However, to the extent that it is considered by this Court, the fact is 
that it is distinguishable from the present case. In Kersey, the unique factual 
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interrogation concluded. 12 Thus, even under the standard advocated by the State, the 
testimony regarding Mr. Parker's invocation of his rights was clearly impermissible. 
Since the comment on Mr. Parker's invocation of his rights was a plain violation 
of his Fifth Amendment rights, the remaining question under the fundamental error test 
is whether that violation likely affected the outcome of the trial. However, since the 
State makes virtually no argument on this point, no further discussion is necessary and 
Mr. Parker simply refers this Court back to his Appellant's Brief (p.32 & n.17). 
D. It Was Misconduct To Offer Opinion Testimony Concerning Mr. Parker's 
Purported Lack Of Truthfulness And/Or His Guilt Of The Charged Offense 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parker argued that it was misconduct for the State to 
offer Detective Heatherly's "expert" opinion that Mr. Parker was guilty, and that he was 
lying when he denied his guilt. 13 (Appellant's Brief, pp.33-39.) In particular, he argued 
circumstances were such that the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that "it was more 
reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant was not, rather than that he was, 
avoiding giving incriminating admissions when he invoked his right to remain silent." 
Kersey, 406 SO.2d at 559-60. Nevertheless, the Kersey Court still cautioned that "the 
interrogation came dangerously close to offending defendant's significant constitutional 
right to remain silent .... " Id. at 560. 
12 "'Relevant Evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401 (emphasis added). 
13 Unfortunately, police officers are trained to believe, and in fact do believe, that they 
are human lie detectors; in reality though, lie detection techniques taught to police 
officers are not reliable and lead to any heightened ability to detect lies. Dr. Leo 
described this phenomenon, and its critical role in the problem of false confessions, 
thusly: 
Because misclassifying innocent suspects is a necessary condition for all 
false confessions and wrongful convictions, it is both the first and the most 
consequential error that police make. 
There are many cognitive errors that lead police to classify an 
innocent person mistakenly as a guilty suspect. Perhaps the most 
prominent stems from poor and erroneous investigation training. American 
oolice are taught. falsely, that thev can become human lie detectors 
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that it was misconduct for Detective Heatherly to: (a) testify that it was an important 
"cue" to him that, at one point, Mr. Parker did not deny a specific allegation (instead, 
Mr. Parker said "okay" and let the detective continue) because "an honest or innocent 
person, if they are not-have not done- ... in my training and experience, someone 
that-most people, when they are accused of something they didn't do, will deny it" 
(Tr., p.316, L.14 - p.317, L.11); (b) gratuitously comment on cross-examination, that 
Mr. Parker's truthfulness "was lying to me about certain things" (Tr., p.326, Ls.21-22); 
and (c) testify that he uses "theme development" as an interrogation technique, as he 
previously testified he did in this case (see Tr., p.329, Ls.7-11, p.332, L.24 - p.333, 
L.21, p.335, Ls.16-18), U[w]hen an individual is there and has lied to me ... so that later 
on he will come out with the truth" (Tr., p.336, Ls.4-12). (Appellant's Brief, pp.33-39.) 
Incorporated within this argument was Mr. Parker's contention that the district court 
capable of distinguishing truth from deception at high, if not near perfect, 
rates of accuracy. (The Chicago-based firm Reid and Associates, for 
example, claims that detectives can learn to discriminate truth and 
deception accurately 85 percent of the time, although this rate seems to 
be represented in their training seminars as 100 percent.) Detectives are 
misleadingly taught, for example, that the subject who averts his gaze, 
slouches, shifts his body posture, touches his nose, adjusts or cleans his 
glasses, chews his fingernails, or strokes the back of his head is likely to 
be lying and thus is guilty. The subject who is guarded, uncooperative, 
and offers broad denials and qualified responses is also believed to be 
deceptive and therefore guilty. However, social scientific studies have 
repeatedly demonstrated across a variety of contexts that people are poor 
human lie detectors and thus are highly prone to error in their judgment 
about whether an individual is lying or telling the truth. Most people get it 
right at rates that are no better than chance (i.e., 50%) or the flip of a coin. 
Moreover, specific studies of police interrogators have found that they 
cannot reliably distinguish between truthful and false denials of guilt at 
levels greater than chance; indeed, they routinely make erroneous 
judgments. 
Leo, supra (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
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committed evidentiary error in allowing the detective to offer the initial piece of 
challenged testimony (concerning Detective Heatherly's opinion that Mr. Parker was 
guilty because he did not deny a specific allegation). (Appellant's Brief, pp.35-37.) With 
regard to the additional testimony, and to the extent that his objection to the first piece 
of challenged testimony was not preserved, Mr. Parker argued that the State's 
misconduct rose to the level of fundamental error. (Appellant's Brief, pp.37 -39.) 
In response, the State contends that Detective Heatherly did not opine as to 
Mr. Parker's guilt (but merely explained why he "persisted to question [Mr.] Parker at 
that point") (Respondent's Brief, pp.35-40); it argues that the first bit of testimony 
Detective Heatherly gave concerning his belief that Mr. Parker lied was an invited error 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.40-41); it claims that that Detective Heatherly's second set of 
statements concerning his belief that Mr. Parker lied was not, in fact, directed at 
Mr. Parker specifically, but was merely an explanation "in broad generalities what his 
interview strategy is" (Respondent's Brief, p.42); finally, it asserts that the claimed 
misconduct does not rise to the level of fundamental error (Respondent's Brief, p.43). 
These arguments, however, are without merit. 
1. Detective Heatherly Offered An Opinion As To Mr. Parker's Guilt 
It is utter nonsense for the State to claim that Detective Heatherly did not give an 
opinion as to Mr. Parker's guilt when he testified that Mr. Parker's failure to deny a 
certain allegation was a significant "cue" because, in his "training and experience, 
someone that-most people, when they are accused of something they didn't do, will 
deny it." Although the State reasons that "[t]he jury was entitled to know why the 
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detective persisted to question [Mr.] Parker at that point" (Respondent's Brief, p.38),14 
the simple fact is that the detective's subjective reasons for continuing the interrogation 
of Mr. Parker are both self-evident15 and patently irrelevant. 16 Contrary to the State's 
suggestion, it has no right to present testimony regarding the irrelevant thought 
processes of its witnesses. Plainly, this tactic of having the detective testify about why 
he found Mr. Parker's statement to be a "cue," was nothing more than an unscrupulous 
attempt to bootstrap patently inadmissible evidence into the jury box. 
Interestingly, in the same paragraph in which it argues that Detective Heatherly 
did not give his opinion as to Mr. Parker's guilt (see Respondent's Brief, pp.37-38), the 
State seems to concede that he did, in fact, give his opinion, and that that opinion was 
properly admitted because it was based on a reasonable inference: ''That view of 
human nature is too apparent for debate." (See Respondent's Brief, p.38 & n.11.) The 
State's argument in this regard is frivolous. As was made clear in Mr. Parker's 
Appellant's Brief (pp.35-37), a witness-even an expert witness-may not usurp the 
jury's function by opining by passing upon the credibility of witnesses or weighing 
disputed evidence. This is so even if the conclusion testified to is "too apparent for 
14 Elsewhere, the State contends that "Detective Heatherly did not give any opinion 
about Parker's ultimate guilt, only that he noted Parker failed to respond to a direct 
accusation the way most people do when wrongly accused." (Respondent's Brief, 
p.39.) 
15 The State contends that it was important for the prosecution to explain why the 
detective "continue[d] his questioning of [Mr.] Parker, and [did] not unthinkingly accept 
his initial denial." (Respondent's Brief, p.38.) However, such a claim is absurd. One 
does not need to be a legal scholar to know that a police officer is not doing his job if he 
accepts a suspect's initial denial of wrongdoing and immediately ceases all questioning. 
The lay jurors would have understood quite clearly that Detective Heatherly had an 
obligation to thoroughly question Mr. Parker. 
16 See note 12, supra (providing the definition of "Relevant Evidence"). 
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debate" because, as the Idaho Supreme Court recently explained, "Expert testimony 
that concerns conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the 
facts utilizing the juror's common sense and normal experience is inadmissible." 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 66 (2011). 
The State attempts to distinguish Ellington from this case by pointing out that the 
offending testimony came from a true expert, while here, Detective Heatherly was not 
an expert "qualified to interpret non-responses of suspects who have been accused of 
criminal wrongdoing." (Respondent's Brief, pp.38-40.) While Mr. Parker whole-
heartedly agrees that Detective Heatherly is no expert on the subject on which he 
opined, the reality is that prosecution certainly presented him as such. The prosecutor 
asked Detective Heatherly multiple questions about his training and experience, and 
thereby elicited testimony concerning his training at "John Reid's Interview and 
Interrogation SchooL" (Tr., p.310, L.17 - p.312, L.7.) Thereafter, the following 
exchange occurred: 
Q. Is it fair to say you have fairly extensive training in interview 
techniques? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it also fair to say that that's sort of what you do at the police 
station? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many interviews of suspects would you say you have 
completed? 
A. I would say two to three thousand, but it is probablx-I don't 
want to go over-it's probably more like seven or eight thousand 7_ 
17 Assuming 250 work days per year, over the course of his 16-year career, Detective 
Heatherly would have worked 4,000 days. In order for him to have completed 7,000 to 
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Q. A lot. 
A. -interviews. 
Yes. 
(Tr., p.311, L.19 - p.312, L.7.) In addition, Detective Smith testified that Detective 
Heatherly had "some special training in interview skills." (Tr., p.234, Ls.7-11.) Finally, 
and perhaps most crucially, Detective Heatherly himself suggested he has the 
specialized skills necessary to detect lies and determine guilt based on verbal cues and 
body language. In testifying that he believed Mr. Parker was guilty based on the fact 
that Mr. Parker did not deny a specific allegation, Detective Heatherly prefaced his 
answer with "in my training and experience," thereby suggesting that his opinion was 
the product of some specialized skill set not possessed by members of the general 
public. (Tr., p.317, Ls.7-11.) A short while later, while testifying about when he decides 
to turn up the heat on a suspect, he stated that "[ilt starts out as interview, until I deem 
that I think that the subject is not being truthful, then, yes, it can turn into an 
interrogation (Tr., p.326, LS.12-15 (emphasis added», suggesting that he has the ability 
to detect lies. 
Practically speaking, the State cannot have it both ways. It cannot present the 
training, experience, and other credentials of every officer who testifies, and specifically 
train its officers at POST to preface every answer on the witness stand with "in my 
training and experience," all in a blatant ploy to lend an aura of credibility to every word 
8,000 suspect interviews per year, he would have had to have interviewed, on average, 
approximately two suspects per day every single day that he worked throughout his 
entire career. Indeed, even if he only engaged in his conservatively-estimated 2,000 to 
3,000 suspect interviews, that would still be more than one suspect interview per every 
two days every single day of his career. While these estimates may be overblown, they 
certainly paint a picture-undoubtedly by design-of an interrogation expert. 
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uttered by those officers, then turn around and claim that its officers' opinions were not 
offered as "expert" opinions. Whether it is convenient to the State's current position or 
not, the simple reality is that State tried to enhance Detective Heatherly's credibility by 
presenting him as an interrogation expert, trained to detect lies and determine guilt 
based on verbal cues and body language. Now it has to live with the consequences of 
that tactic. 
Regardless though, even if Detective Heatherly's opinions concerning 
Mr. Parker's guilt/innocence and truthfulness/untruthfulness were not presented as 
expert opinions, they were still improper. The fact is that no witness-lay or expert-is 
entitled to usurp the jury's function. See State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 855 (Ct. App. 
1991) ("[Bloth expert and lay opinions are subject to the restriction that when the 
question is one which can be decided by persons of ordinary experience and 
knowledge, it is for the trier of fact to decide. The court or jury must weigh the truth of 
the facts presented by the witnesses and draw its conclusions by the exercise of 
independent judgment and reasoning powers, without hearing the opinions of 
witnesses.") (citation omitted).) Accordingly, there can be little doubt that the 
prosecution engaged in misconduct by offering this opinion testimony.18 
18 With regard to the evidentiary component of Mr. Parker's claim of error in admission 
of Detective Heatherly's opinion testimony, the State argues in a footnote that 
Mr. Parker'S objection was inadequate to preserve the issue for appellate review. (See 
Respondent's Brief, p.37 n.10.) The State claims that when defense counsel objected 
to the prosecutor's question as to why it was a "cue" to Detective Heatherly that 
Mr. Parker did not deny a specific allegation, that objection was premature; the State 
contends that Mr. Parker's counsel should not have objected until after Detective 
Heatherly's response was given. (See Respondent's Brief, p.37 n.10.) While this 
argument certainly tracks the district court's reasoning (see Tr., p.316, L.24 - p.317, 
L.3), it is incorrect as a matter of law. See State v. o '8 rya n , 96 Idaho 548, 556 (1975) 
35 
2. The Defense Did Not Invite Detective Heatherly's Improper Opinion 
Testimony Concerning Mr. Parker's Truthfulness 
The State further argues that any error in the admission of Detective Heatherly's 
opinion that Mr. Parker lied during his interrogation was invited by the defense because, 
on cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective Heatherly if Mr. Parker had 
been "cooperative" during his interrogation. (Respondent's Brief, pp.40-41.) The State 
reasons that Detective Heatherly's comments about Mr. Parker having lied was simply a 
qualification of his response to defense counsel's question about whether Mr. Parker 
had been cooperative. (Respondent's Brief, p.41.) 
A close look at the exchange between defense counsel and Detective Heatherly 
reveals that the State's argument is without merit. Detective Heatherly's cross-
examination, began as follows: 
Q. Detective, now you testified as to your training in interviewing, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And these are primarily-these interviews are primarily 
interrogations of suspects, correct? 
A. It starts out as interview until I deem that I think that the subject 
is not being truthful, then, yes, it can turn into interrogation. 
Q. Would this qualify as an interrogation, what we saw? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So he was being cooperative with you the entire time 
then? 
("In numerous decisions, this Court has stated that an objection to evidence must be 
timely. Normally, an objection should be made as soon as the question is asked.") 
(citations omitted). Thus, while defense counsel certainly could have tried to renew his 
objection once the improper opinion testimony was given, his failure to do so does not 
render his proper, timely objection to a question clearly calling for improper opinion 
testimony somehow ineffective or invalid. 
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A. Well, he was being cooperative, but he was lying to me about 
certain things, 
Q. Okay, So when does it switch from interview to interrogation? 
You have distinguished-
A. Yes. 
Q. -cooperation from lying. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What would be noncooperation, if lying is not 
noncooperation. 
A. I'm sorry. Say that again. 
Q. What would be noncooperation if lying, in your mind, is not 
noncooperation? 
A. No, I didn't say lying wasn't-well, yeah, lying is noncooperation. 
(Tr., p.326, L6 - p.327, L 1 0 (emphasis added).) A close look at Detective Heatherly's 
testimony reveals that when he initially conceded that Mr. Parker had been cooperative, 
but then added a comment about his belief that Mr. Parker had lied, he did not intend 
the comment about lying to be a qualification of the term "cooperative." Indeed, 
immediately after he gave that testimony, he admitted that noncooperation and lying 
were different issues as far as he was concerned. (Tr., p.326, L25 - p.327, L3.) It was 
not until a couple questions later that Detective Heatherly decided that he would 
characterize lying as being noncooperative. (See Tr., p.327, Ls.4-10.) Thus, when 
Detective Heatherly first brought up his belief that Mr. Parker had lied, that was nothing 
more than a gratuitous comment on his part, unresponsive to the question that was 
posed by defense counsel (whether Mr. Parker had been cooperative). As such, it 
cannot be said that defense counsel invited the detective's comment on Mr. Parker'S 
truthfulness. 
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3. Detective Heatherly Expressed An Opinion As To Mr. Parker's 
Truthfulness When He Testified As To His Use Of A "Minimization" Theme 
The State contends that when Detective Heatherly testified about using 
"minimization" in interrogations, he was "explaining in broad generalities what his 
interview strategy is," not commenting on Mr. Parker's truthfulness. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.42.) Regardless of what the intent was though, the fact is that Detective 
Heatherly's testimony made it clear that he believed Mr. Parker had lied. 
As was explained in Mr. Parker's Appellant's Brief (pp.34-35 & n.18), Detective 
Heatherly had already told the jury that "minimizing" was a theme that he uses 
(Tr., p.335, Ls.16-18), and that he had used this "minimization" technique in 
interrogating Mr. Parker (Tr., p.329, Ls.7-11; Tr., p.332, L.24 - p.333, L.21). It was only 
after he gave this testimony that he explained that uses "minimization" when a suspect 
has lied: 
When an individual is there and has lied to me, from what I'm 
seeing, I take it that he is lying about the incident that the victim has 
alleged. What I'm wanting to do is have that person begin to talk to me 
about it, and I try to minimize it so that later on he will come out with the 
truth. 
(Tr., p.336, Ls.4-12.) Given this series of answers by Detective Heatherly, he made it 
very clear to the jury that he believed Mr. Parker had lied to him. 
4. Proffering Detective Heatherly's Opinions Concerning Mr. Parker's 
Truthllnnocence And His Truthfulness/Untruthfulness Constituted 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Rising To The Level Of Fundamental Error 
The State argues that, because Mr. Parker cannot show error at all, there can be 
no fundamental error and, even if there was error, he has failed to show prejudice, as is 
required for fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, p.43.) Because the State's 
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arguments in this regard are cursory and simply incorporate the arguments made 
elsewhere in its Respondent's Brief, not further discussion is required herein. Instead, 
Mr. Parker refers this Court back to the fundamental error arguments set forth in his 
Appellant's Brief (pp.37 -39). 
E. It Was Misconduct To Seek Mr. Parker's Conviction Based On Juror Sympathy 
For The Alleged Victim And/Or Anger At Mr. Parker, Rather Than The Trial 
Evidence 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parker argued that the prosecutor engaged in 
misconduct when he used TS.'s nightmare (during which he supposedly engaged in the 
"sleep talk" discussed above) as a metaphor to invoke sympathy for TS. and/or anger 
at Mr. Parker. (Appel/ant's Brief, pp.39-44.) 
In response, the State's argument is straightforward; it contends that the 
prosecutor's discussion of TS.'s "sleep talk" and nightmare during the State's opening 
statement and closing arguments was permissible comment on the evidence that was 
presented at trial. (Respondent's Brief, pp.43-48.) 
The State's arguments are unremarkable. The fact is that the prosecutor's 
opening statement and closing arguments largely speak for themselves. Accordingly, 
no further response is necessary herein. Instead, Mr. Parker simply refers this Court 
back to his Appellant's Brief (pp.39-44). 
III. 
The Accumulation of Errors In This Case Deprived Mr. Parker Of A Fair Trial 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Parker argued that, although he believes the errors 
complained of on appeal are prejudicial in their own right, "to the extent that this Court 
disagrees and finds any of those errors to be harmless, Mr. Parker asserts that he is" 
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still entitled to a new trial because the "errors, when aggregated, show the absence of a 
fair trial in contravention of his constitutional rights." (Appellant's Brief, p.45.) 
In response, the State claims that the cumulative error doctrine has no 
applicability in this case because it only applies when there are multiple objected-to 
errors and, according to the State, Mr. Parker has only preserved one claim of error by 
way of an objection. (Respondent's Brief, pp.48-49 (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 230 (2010).) 
The State's argument would be well-taken if the State had correctly characterized 
the claims presented on appeal. However, it has not. Mr. Parker has challenged two 
separate preserved errors. First, he challenged the admission of T.S.'s out~of-court 
statements, as relayed through the statements of his interrogators in the videotape of 
his interrogation (which was preserved through "hearsay" and "prejudice" objections). 
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.8-13.) Later, he challenged the admission of Detective 
Heatherly's "expert" opinion that Mr. Parker lied when he denied having sexual contact 
with T.S. (which was preserved through an objection that "he is trying to give a 
conclusion about guilt or innocence).19 (See Appellant's Brief, pp.33-37.) 
19 Although Mr. Parker'S argument in this regard was asserted within a portion of his 
Appellant's Brief which generally raised a claim of fundamental error based on the 
prosecutor's misconduct in presenting Detective Heatherly's testimony in this regard, 
and it was not set off from the general prosecutorial misconduct argument with a 
separate section heading, this preserved claim of evidentiary error was nonetheless 
clear. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.33-37.) It was extensive, spanning nearly five pages of 
the Appellant's Brief. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.33-37.) Further, the State clearly 
understood the argument presented; in responding to the overarching prosecutorial 
misconduct argument, the State recognized that Mr. Parker had asserted a claim of 
preserved error, although it disagreed as to whether the defense objection was 
adequate. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.35, 37 & n.10.) Further, it addressed the 
substance of Mr. Parker's claim, arguing fairly extensively that Detective Heatherly's 
testimony was admissible. (See Respondent's Brief, pp.37-40.) 
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Because there are two claims of preserved error asserted in this appeal, 
Mr. Parker's cumulative error argument is properly before this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Parker respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 2013. 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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